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CONTEMPT POWEJU OF THE ADMINLSTRAIWE LAW JUDGE
Joyce Krutick Barlow 1
Introduction
It is the purpose of this artide to explore the law concerning the
inherent contempt powers possessed by an Administrative Law Judge (Al) and
the extent of this power, and to propose statutory and regulatory changes that
would codify these powers.
Conduct of the Hearing by the AU
It is well established that an Administrative Law Judge has the
right and the duty to control the conduct of the hearing. Moreover, the manner
in which the hearing is conducted rests in the sole discretion of the Administrative
Law Judge. ' The Administrative Conference of the United States, in its Manual
For Administrative Law Judges, indicates that
The Judge must control the hearing. As soon as the subject
under inquiry is exhausted or fully developed, the Judge should stop
counsel or the witness and direct him to go to other matters. If a
question or an answer is irrelevant or improper, the Judge should strike
it without waiting for an objection. 4
1 Administrative Law Judge, Newark, New Jersey. This article was written by Judge Barlow in
her private capacity. No official support or endorsement by the Office of Hearings and Appeals,
the Social Security Administration or the Department of Health and Human Services is intended or
should be inferred. This article first appeared in 2 OHA Law Journal 31 (Fall, 1991) and is reprinted
here with permission.
2The writer gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Judge Ronnie A. Yoder of the
Department of Transportation who, inthe earl stages of the writer's research on this subject,provided copies of his own decisions and other useful material.
3 See Butz v. Economou 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971);
Association of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F.Supp. 1132 (D.D.C. 1984).
4 M. Ruhlen, Manual For Administrative Law Judges 62 (rev. ed. 1982) (emphasis added).
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While an AU has the duty to control the hearing, counsel has
a duty to maintain the dignity of the judicial or administrative tribunal. s In
some states, attorneys must acknowledge this duty when taking the oath of
office. An excellent example is the Oath of Admission To The Florida Bar. Each
member is sworn to "maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers." 6 Two questions arise from the consideration of these basic concepts:
what constitutes a violation of counsel's duty to maintain the dignity of judicial
proceedings, and what power does an Administrative Law Judge have to punish
such violations? '
Contempt Defined
Contempt is generally defined as induding "conduct
inappropriate to the particular role of the actor, be he udge, juror, party, witness,
counsel or spectator." ' In United States v. Seale, the court enumerated a
four-prong test to determine whether conduct is punishable as contempt. The
conduct must constitute misbehavior; it must reach a level which obstructs the
administration of justice; it must be committed in the presence of the judge (or
so dose that it obstructs justice); and some intent to obstruct justice must be
present. "o Thus, it has been said that any action which is designed or
5 See Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-36 (1980).
6 The Oath of Admission appears in each monthly edition of The Florida Bar Journal.
7It has been supgested that punishment of attorney misconduct before an Administrative Law
Judge might be ef-ected through the use of state bar associations. However, it has been this
writer's experience that when such attempts are made (at least within New Jersey) the Bar
Association has been unwilling to involve itself, believing that judges ought to punish for contempt
if contempt occurs. Perhaps in states with an integrated bar such as Florida such efforts may be
more effective.
8 United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 366(7th Cir. 1972) (citing Katz v. Murtagh, 28 N.Y.
2d 234, 269 N.E. 2d 816, 321 N.Y.S. 2d 104 (1971)).
9 Id.
101Id. at 367.
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calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct the judge in the administration of
justice, or to lessen the court's authority or dignity, is a contempt. " Moreover,
a contempt of court is "a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its
authority, justice and dignity." 12
In this author's opinion, all judges have the power to punish
contemptuous conduct. "3 This has been ruled upon numerous times by the
Supreme Court, and the Court has held that judges are required to exercise that
power to preserve judidal decorum and to ensure the respectability of the legal
profession. 14 In the words of Chief Justice John Marshall: "[lit is extremely
desirable that the respectability of the bar should be maintained, and that its
harmony with the bench should be preserved. For these objects, some controlling
power, some discretion ought to reside in the Court." s
This doctrine was restated in ex parte Robinson 16 as follows:
The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its
existence is essential to the preservation of order in judidal proceedings,
and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the
courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice. The
moment the courts of the United States were called into existence and
invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of this
power .... As thus seen the power of these courts in the punishments
of contempts can only be exerdsed to insure order and decorum in their
1 1 United States v. Ross, 243 F.Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
121n re Mengel, 201 F.Supp. 687, 689 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
1 3 See ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529 (1824).
14/d
151d. at 530.
1686 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505 (1873).
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presence, to secure faithfulness on the part of their officers in their
official transactions, and to enforce obedience to their lawful orders,
judgments, and processes. 17
In the context of all judges' inherent power to punish contempt
it must be remembered that U.S. Administrative Law Judges are "functionally
comparable" to trial judges. " Thus, while "sanctions available to federal
administrative law judges may be more limited ... the power to find and
sanction contempt is no less important or real." 'g
Some legal scholars have postulated that Administrative Law
Judges do not have contempt power. This is predicated largely upon the decision
of the Supreme Court in ICC v. Brimson. 20 Brimson established the rule that
agencies have no "authority to compel obedience to [their] orders by a judgment
of fine or imprisonment." 21 However, as aptly pointed out by Chief Judge
Robinson (Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit)
in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. United States Department of Energy, 22 Brimson was
decided at a time when the present administrative law system was unheard of.
In addition, most of the scholarship on this issue has failed to distinguish between
an Administrative Law Judge exercising a judicial function and an agency seeking
to have a subpoena (issued pursuant to its investigative responsibilities) enforced.
Moreover, Judge Robinson is perhaps one of the first jurists to recognize that
Brimson "is wholly silent as to the power [of] an agency acting in an authorized
judicial or quasijudicial capacity to impose sanctions short of a fine or
1 7 1d. at 510-11.
18Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
: Responsibility Before Administrative Tribunals, presented at Federal Bar
Association Seminar i-eq. 'i, I
20154 U.S. 447 (1894).
211d. at 485.
22769 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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imprisonment in order to compel compliance with discovery orders issued during
the course of an adjudicatory proceeding." 23
Since the creation of an extensive administrative law system, the
courts have recognized the authority of Congress to delegate to such agencies
the power to adjudicate certain daims between members of the public and the
government. In fact, this authority was first recognized in Brimson. 24 This
principle was reiterated in 1932 in the case of Crowell v. Benson. 25 It is this
writer's contention that when taken together, Benson, Brimson and several other
Supreme Court decisions which will be discussed infra establish without question
that Administrative Law Judges sit in "legislative courts" and thus have all the
powers available to judges of such courts, including the power to punish for
contempt.
The Administrative Law Judge
Presides Over a Legislative Court
Legislative courts are courts created by Congress in conjunction
with the exercise of its legislative powers. The Supreme Court first recognized the
status of such courts in American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton. 26
Referring to the courts of the Territory of Florida, Chief Justice Marshall noted that
such courts do not derive their power from the judicial power dause of the
Constitution (artide Ill) but rather from the power of Congress to exercise
authority over the territories. 21
23Id. at 793 (emphasis in original).
24154 U.S. at 475-77.
25285 U.S. 22 (1932).
2626 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
2 7 1d. at 546.
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In 1929, the Court was called upon to determine whether the
Court of Customs Appeals was a legislative or constitutional court. ' Although
the decision in that case holding this court to be a legislative court was later
overruled, ' it is important in that it further defines a legislative court. In the
words of Mr. Justice Van Devanter:
[liJt long has been settled that artide 3 does not express the full authority
of Congress to create courts, and that other artides invest Congress with
powers in the exertion of which it may create inferior courts and dothe
them with functions deemed essential or helpful in carrying those
powers into execution. But there is a difference between the two
dasses of courts. Those established under the specific power given in
section 2 of artide 3 are called constitutional courts. They share in the
exerdse of the judidal power defined in that section, can be invested
with no other jurisdiction, and have judges who hold office during good
behavior, with no power in Congress to provide otherwise. On the
other hand, those created by Congress in the exertion of other powers
are called legislative courts. Their functions always are directed to the
execution of one or more of such powers, and are prescribed by
Congress independently of section 2 of artide 3; and their judges hold
for such term as Congress prescribes, whether it be a fixed period of
years or during good behavior....
Legislative courts also may be created as special tribunals to
examine and determine various matters, arising between the
government and others, which from their nature do not require judicial
determination and yet are susceptible of it. The mode of determining
matters of this dass is completely within congressional control. Congress
may reserve to itself the power to decide, may delegate that power to
executive officers, or may commit it to judicial tribunals. o
2 8Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
2 91n 1962, the Court held that the Court of Customs Appeals was indeed a constitutional
court. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). The Court did not, however, disturb thatportion of its prior decision defining a legislative court.
30279 U.S. at 449-51.
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As was noted in Bakelite, 313 daimants before legislative
courts do not have a right to sue unless Congress agrees to allow suit, and only
then with such limitations as Congress chooses to impose. Thus, when Congress
grants the privilege to sue, a daimant suing in a legislative court must abide by
the conditions imposed. 32 In ultimately ruling that the Court of Customs
Appeals was a legislative court, the Supreme Court recited the history of the
Customs Court at length. It is noteworthy that there are striking similarities
between the Customs Court and the tribunal presided over by Administrative Law
Judges. " Initially, the Customs Court was known as the Board of General
Appraisers. Later, Congress sought to make the Board a court by simply
changing the name without altering its powers, duties or staffing. Essentially, the
Customs Court was an executive agency which reviewed actions taken by
appraisers and collectors who appraised and dassified imported items and
collected duties.
Administrative Law Judges, whether they serve in the Office of
Hearings and Appeals of the Social Security Administration, or for that matter, any
other agency, preside over special tribunals created by Congress in the exerdse of
its legislative powers to hear matters that "admit of legislative or executive
determination, and yet from their nature are susceptible of determination by
courts." " Moreover, the relationship between these administrative law
tribunals and the executive administration of specific statutes "shows very plainly
that [they are] legislative" courts.
31See id. at 452.
3 2 See id.
33See generally id. at 457-59.
341Id.
351d. at 452.
3 6 See id. at 459.
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When one examines the statute from which Administrative Law
Judges derive their power, it is abundantly dear that the AU has powers which
are identical to those possessed by judges presiding over other courts. Thus
Congress specifically authorized the AU to preside over hearings. 33
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has twice held that the Administrative Law
Judge has the duty to direct the course of the hearing. ' Thus it is my view
(and the view of other judges, both Administrative Law Judges and judges of
courts of record) that the power to punish for contempt flows directly from the
statutory power to conduct hearings and the duty to direct the course of those
hearings.
It has generally been assumed that because subpoenas issued
by administrative agendes must be enforced through district court enforcement
proceedings, the judges serving in those agendes have no contempt power. It
is important again to distinguish between the agency's investigative function and
its judidal arm. One must look to Judge Robinson's holding in Atlantic Richfield
Co. that administrative agencies do have the power to impose some types of
sanctions. '
Perhaps the most common ground for fear of recognizing AU
contempt power is that, because the AU serves in the executive branch of
government, there is the threat of abuse. However, in this context it is important
to note that, as the AU is appointed for life subject to removal for good cause,
such fear is groundless. It is precisely this type of independence from improper
influences which led the Supreme Court to hold in Butz v. Economou: 40
We think that adjudication within a federal administrative
agency shares enough of the characteristics of the judidal process that
those who partidpate in such adjudication should also be immune from
suits for damages. The conflicts which federal hearing examiners seek
375 U.S.C. § 556 (1988).
38See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
39769 F.2d at 792-96.
40438 U.S. 478.
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to resolve are every bit as fractious as those which come to court ....
Moreover, federal administrative law requires that agency adjudication
contain many of the same safeguards as are available in the judicial
process ....
There can be little doubt that the role of the modern federal
hearing examiner or administrative law judge within this framework is
"functionally comparable" to that of a judge. His powers are often, if not
generally, comparable to those of a trial judge: He may issue
subpoenas, rule on proffers of evidence, regulate the course of the
hearing, and make or recommend decisions ....
In light of these safeguards, we think that the risk of an
unconstitutional act by one presiding at an agency hearing is dearly
outweighed by the importance of preserving the independent judgment
of these men and women.41
Sanctions Available to the AU
What sanctions, then, may be imposed for contempt? As
previously noted, the Administrative Law Judge's power to punish for contempt
is, at present, more limited than that of other judges. However, sanctions are
available. For example, in order to assure that flared tempers do not disrupt the
proceedings, the AU may call a recess and leave the bench. In addition, when
any person in the courtroom becomes "unruly' or expresses offensive remarks, the
individual may be warned against repetition. Also, material may be physically
stricken from the record as a sanction for contempt. 42 In cases of attorney
contempt, the attorney may be excluded from further participation in the
matter. 4 Last, disciplinary action against an attorney may be recommended
to the agency.
4 11d. at 512-14.
4 2 M. Ruhlen, supra note 3, at 64.
4 31d.
44Id.
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That these sanctions fall far short of what is required for the
effective administration of the hearing process is abundantly dear. All too often
the AU is faced with counsel who is obstreperous and/or contumacious. One
way to deal with such conduct, in cases involving Social Security or SSI daims,
would be to reduce the counsel's fee where there is a grant of benefrts to the
daimant. With the change in the statutory scheme for payment of fees, such a
remedy is no longer available. Thus, in this author's opinion, the time has come
for express codification of the Administrative Law Judge's implied power of
contempt.
Proposed Legislative Changes
It is this author's suggestion that 5 U.S.C. be amended to add
a section that would read as follows:
An Administrative Law Judge appointed pursuant to this title shall have
power to punish by fine, at the discretion of such Judge, such contempt
of the Judge's authority, and none other, as -
(1) misbehavior of any person in the presence of the
Administrative Law Judge, or so near as to obstruct the administration
of justice; or
(2) disobedience or resistance to a lawful order, rule, command,
or decision of the Administrative Law Judge.
The Administrative Law Judge shall have such assistance in
carrying out his or her lawful order, rule, command, or decision as is available to
a court of the United States. "
Regulations which would conform to each agency's practice
ought to be enacted giving due consideration to the procedural format of that
agency's hearing office or, as often referred to in other agencies, office of
4 5 Adapted from 26 U.S.C. § 7456 (1988) empowering Tax Court judges to punish for
contempt. The Tax Court has been held to be a legislative court. See, e.g., Continental Equities
v. CIR, 551 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1977).
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administrative law. The Bankruptcy Court's Rule 9020 ' providing for summary
determination of contempt committed in the presence of the judge, and notice
and hearing in the case of contempt not in the presence of the judge, might well
serve as a model for regulations governing the Administrative Law Judge's
contempt power.
Ultimately we must rely on the sound discretion of the AU in
the exercise of these powers. Given the lack of extensive case law surrounding
the contempt powers of other legislative court judges (i.e., tax, etc.), it is unlikely
that there will be a significant increase in litigation against the Agency. It is this
author's firm belief that her colleagues will not violate the faith held in them by
the Supreme Court when it extended to them judicial immunity. The Court
believed that "the risk of an unconstitutional act by one presiding at an agency
hearing" needed to be measured against the need for judicial independence.
We must also weigh the risk of an abuse of the contempt power against the.
need for the orderly administration of justice. Surely, the confidence of the Court
in the Administrative Law Judge has been borne out, and thus, potential abuse
should be of minimal concern.
Condusion
While it is dear to this author that the Administrative Law Judge
has contempt power, this power is more limited than that of our
nonadministrative counterparts sitting on the federal district court or appellate
court benches. In order to both expand and solidify our contempt powers as
presently operative, legislation should be enacted towards this end. Such
legislation would comport with the right and the duty of the Administrative Law
Judge to control the conduct of the hearing and would enhance the efficiency of
the Social Security claims process ' towards more directed and equitable
proceedings.
4611 U.S.C. Rule 9020 (1988). This Rule is used here solely as a model for what form
proposed regulations may take.
4 7 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
4 8 This applies as Well to any agency utilizing ALJs for its hearing process.
